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Abstract 
 
Using unique personnel data from one Russian firm for the years 1997 to 2002 we 
study the size, development and determinants of the gender earnings gap in an internal 
labor market during late transition. The gap is sizable but declines strongly over the 
entire period. Gender earnings differentials are largest for production workers who 
constitute the largest employee group in the firm. Various decompositions show that 
these differentials and their dynamics remain largely unexplained by observable 
characteristics at the mean and across the wage distribution. Our analysis also reveals 
that the earnings differentials for production workers largely stem from job 
assignment, as women are predominately assigned to lower paid jobs. Earnings gaps 
within job levels are small and almost fully explained by observed characteristics.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Research on the gender wage gap in labor markets in transition is part of a more 
general agenda that focuses on the question whether transition has brought a 
worsening of women’s position in the labor market or whether they have benefited 
from the liberalization of the economic system. In this paper, we analyze the size, 
development, and the determinants of the gender earnings gap within a large Russian 
firm.  
In Soviet times gender equality was one of the tenets of the regime’s ideology. Labor 
market participation of women was high and discrimination in pay formally absent. 
However, socialist reality was somewhat less rosy for women as they were confronted 
with the difficult task to combine work in the household with the job in the enterprise 
and as they found themselves predominantly in “female” occupations that 
commanded lower wages. Occupational segregation thus led to the existence of a 
gender wage gap under socialism, part of which was unexplained by observed 
productivity characteristics (Malceva and Roshchin, 2006).   
With the onset of transition from a centrally planned to a market economy the 
socio-economic structures in Russia have seen dramatic changes that had more 
pronounced effects for women: a collapsing welfare system and the substantial 
reduction in child care facilities were accompanied by a sharp increase in open 
unemployment, but also the possibility to specialize in home production as an 
alternative to market work for the first time in generations. In addition, the 
restructuring of many privatized enterprises and the increase in competition in product 
markets through trade liberalization as well as the entry of de novo private firms had a 
profound impact on developments in the Russian labor market. For the most part, 
these developments have changed the situation of women for the worse; in particular 
they have drastically reduced life-long employment opportunities in large firms and 
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have made labor market attachment for women in general more tenuous. This overall 
change in women’s position in the Russian labor market needs to be kept in mind 
when analyzing the issue of gender earnings differentials in that country.   
 One strand of the literature on the gender wage gap (GWG) in transition 
countries compares the GWG just before the transition to the gap in the early years of 
transition. In this literature, the initial regime switch is perceived as a quasi-natural 
experiment that presumably enables researchers to establish a causal effect of 
transition on the gender wage gap in former Socialist economies.  As stressed by 
Jurajda (2005) and Brainerd (2000), there are above all three forces simultaneously 
determining the dynamics of the GWG pre-and post-transition. On the one hand, a 
dramatic widening of the wage distribution, as happened for example in Russia and 
Ukraine, can increase the gap since women are predominately located in the lower 
part of the wage distribution (Brainerd, 2000). On the other hand, if low skilled 
women leave the employment state on a large scale, as was observed for East 
Germany by Hunt (2002) and for Slovenia by Orazem and Vodopivec (2000), and if 
this effect dominates, the gap can be reduced. A second determinant potentially 
lowering the wage gap after the regime switch are increasing returns to educational 
attainment and other productivity characteristics after liberalization of the labor 
market. Brainerd (2000) provides convincing evidence that these higher returns 
reduce the GWG in several Central European transition countries since their female 
work forces are on average better educated than their male counterparts.  
 The few studies, which are specifically about gender differentials in the 
Russian labor market, all use household survey data. In contrast to Brainerd’s results, 
Reilly (1999) finds a stable monthly earnings differential of about 37 percent – and an 
hourly wage gap of roughly 25 percent - for the years 1992 to 1996. He establishes, 
though, that the “unexplained” part rises over the reported period. The research by 
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Ogloblin (1999), also covering the early years of the Russian transition (1994 to 
1996), suggests that occupational segregation explains most of the gender wage gap. 
Using panel data, the study by Kazakova (2007) covers a more mature stage of the 
Russian transition and, using a panel with full wage data, finds that the GWG 
decreases from 35 percent in 1996 to 16 percent in 2002.   
 Our paper employs personnel panel data of a large Russian manufacturing 
firm and analyzes the gender earnings gap (GEG) within this firm for the years 1997 
to 2002.1 This is the first study not only for Russia, but for any transition economy 
that uses personnel data to look at gender differentials within a firm. Our analysis of 
gender differentials with the help of personnel data contributes in several ways to the 
literature on gender discrimination in transition economies in general, and in Russia in 
particular.  
First, we can establish whether the substantial Russian earnings gap that 
researchers find with household level data “survives” when we look at the internal 
labor market of a large Russian firm. It could well be that most of the earnings gap 
observed with household data comes about because of productivity differences 
between men and women and their sorting into high- and low-paying firms (Kremer, 
1993). Our estimates of the gender earnings gap inside the firm are very similar to 
estimates of the gender earnings gap obtained from household data. Second, we 
explore changes in the gender earnings gap. Again, we find that the development of 
the gender earnings gap at the firm level mirrors the economy-wide development of 
the gender earnings gap in the Russia:  In line with the results of Kazakova (2007) we 
establish a large reduction in the gender differential from around 38 to 18 percent. 
Third, given that the earnings differential “survives” within a large privatized firm 
like ours – one should keep in mind that a large fraction of the Russian workforce is 
                                                 
1 We look at the gender earnings gap and not at the gender wage gap because we do not have precise 
information on hours worked in our data. 
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still employed in such firms – we investigate at the mean and over the entire 
distribution how much of the differential is explained by observed characteristics.  
Fourth, we test several hypotheses about the determinants of the unexplained part of 
the gap. For example, we test whether women are willing to receive lower wages in 
return for larger bonuses, whether female employees are willing to trade off wages for 
employment security, or whether segregation of women within the firm into low job 
levels provides an explanation for the gap.2 Finally, we investigate the determinants of 
the gender earnings gap and changes therein. Employing methods introduced by Juhn, 
Murphy and Pierce (1991) and Machado and Mata (2005) we explore various factors 
influencing changes in gender differentials cited above, namely changes in earnings 
inequality, changes in the composition of the workforce and changes in the rewards to 
productivity characteristics. While the exploration at the means provides some new 
insights about the causes of the reduction in the gender gap, the analysis across the 
entire distributions is new for Russia and of particular interest as it shows that the 
driving force behind the reduction in the earnings gap are brought about by changes in 
the lower part of the earnings distributions. 
The analysis of the gender earnings gap with the help of personnel data can be 
considered an important complementary exercise also for methodological reasons. 
Recent work with matched employer-employee data for Western economies has 
shown that firm specific effects constitute an important determinant of gender 
differentials (see e.g. the evidence for the United States by Bayard et al., 2003, and for 
Germany by Heinze and Wolf, 2006 and 2007). If one is unable to control for 
segregation at the level of the establishment, as is the case with household survey 
data, one overstates the role of occupational and/or sector segregation in the economy. 
Using matched data one can provide evidence of within-establishment and within-
                                                 
2 Ransom and Oaxaca (2005) find that such segregation in a regional grocery chain in the United States 
goes a long way in explaining the earnings gap. 
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occupation segregation. The use of such data might also reduce the bias from 
unobserved heterogeneity by focusing on selected samples of more homogeneous 
groups of workers (Kunze, 2008). Employing personnel data in the analysis of the 
GEG might have the advantage of reducing unobserved heterogeneity to a greater 
degree than can be done with other types of data because of the likely more 
homogeneous nature of the workforce within one particular firm. With personnel data 
it is also better possible, as Kunze (2008) notes, to “more credibly investigate whether 
wage gaps still exist when job characteristics and rank are controlled for.” While 
personnel data from one firm can never be truly representative of a sector or the 
economy at large it permits us to explore internal labor markets in large organizations 
from a gender perspective and pin down those factors that contribute to differential 
treatment of men and women within such organizations. Due to data scarcity only few 
studies on the gender gap within large firms exist; however, their results certainly 
shed additional light on the causes of gender differentials. For example, Barnet-Verzat 
and Wolff (2008) analyze personnel data on executives of a French firm and 
document that the GEG is rather small, ranging from 2 to 5 percent over the entire 
distribution, once hierarchical levels are controlled for, but they do find evidence of a 
“glass ceiling” effect.3              
 Data scarcity has made it difficult for economists to test implications for the 
gender earnings gap that derive from theoretical approaches. Two models come 
especially to mind. Lazear and Rosen (1990) assume that women have a higher 
expected value of time spent at home which implies that they have a higher separation 
probability and require a higher ability threshold in order to be promoted. Two 
important predictions arise from this model: promotion rates (and thus wages) do not 
differ by gender at very high levels of ability, and female wages on average are lower 
                                                 
3 See also Ransom and Oaxaca (2005) for gender differences in pay, mobility and promotion 
opportunities within a U.S. firm and Jones and Makepeace (1996) for evidence from a U.K. firm. 
 6
within a firm since they are underrepresented in high-paying jobs. Booth, Francesconi 
and Frank (2003) moot that even if women are promoted in the same numbers as men, 
this might not automatically attenuate the gender earnings gap. If women have lower 
market opportunities outside the firm upon promotion, they might be promoted to the 
same degree or might even have a higher promotion rate, but they receive lower wage 
increases than men after promotion has occurred. Since we can identify managers in 
our firm, i.e. high ability employees, we can provide an additional data point to test 
the predictions of these two models, albeit in a partial fashion.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section briefly 
describes the firm: the position in its product market, the ownership structure as well 
as its wage and employment policies. Section 3 describes the personnel data, 
measurement issues connected to gender differentials. Section 4 introduces the 
methods used to analyze them. Section 5 presents the results in three parts. First, we 
describe the gender earnings gaps and their decompositions in explained and 
unexplained parts at the means and across the distributions. Then we explore the 
various determinants of the gaps, which we enumerated above. A third part looks at 
changes in the gaps and which of the above cited factors can help explain these 
changes. A final section provides some tentative conclusions.   
   
 
2. The firm and its wage and employment determination 
 
The particular firm, for which we have data, is located in a provincial city in Russia 
and operates in the sector “machine building and metal works.” After having 
converted production lines from Soviet times “nearly one hundred percent”, according 
to the director general of the firm (CEO)4, it produces well equipment for gas and oil 
production and smith-press equipment. More than ninety percent of its production is 
                                                 
4 Source: First interview with the director general of the firm in the spring of 2002.  
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destined for the Russian market. It has locally no competitors, but nationally it has to 
compete with more than 5 firms, among them firms from the European Union that 
export oil equipment to Russia. Nevertheless, being a supplier for the Russian oil 
industry it has been benefiting from the continuous robust growth, which this industry 
has experienced since the aftermath of the financial crisis.5 At any rate, real output, 
capacity utilization and profits were all at a trough in 1998, recovered slightly in 1999 
and then took off dramatically after the year 2000. 6
 How representative is this firm as far as the sector “machine building and 
metal works” and Russian industry at large is concerned? Many privatized large firms 
in the sector and in Russian industry were shedding labor while our firm slightly 
increased its workforce over the reported period. The CEO is considered one of the 
successful managers in Russian industry as he early on in the transition initiated the 
conversion of production from military hardware to equipment serving the Russian oil 
industry. In our opinion, therefore, this firm is representative of a numerically maybe 
small but economically important number of industrial firms that have managed the 
transition to a market-based economy well and that are leaders in their sectors with a 
brighter future than the average large privatized Russian industrial firm.    
                                                 
5 During the financial crisis and in its aftermath, we observe the following monthly inflation rates: 
August ’98 19%, September ’98 39%, October ’98 5% and April ’99 3%. Using the standard definition 
that we speak of hyperinflation when the monthly inflation exceeds 50 percent, it is clear that we 
cannot speak of a hyperinflationary episode in the Russian economy in 1998 and 1999. Moreover, there 
is a rapid decline of monthly rates. 
6 Some additional remarks about the economic environment, in which the firm operates, are in order.  
The years 1997 to 2002 include the financial crisis of August 1998 when the ruble was drastically 
devalued and Russia defaulted on its debt. For our purposes, the crisis is insofar important as it marks a 
hiatus in the Russian transition process. Before the crisis we have a period of great turmoil and 
excessive turnover in the labor market, with a large fraction of the workforce experiencing wage 
arrears and being forced to take unpaid leave (Lehmann, Wadsworth and Acquisti, 1999, and Earle and 
Sabiarianova, 2002). In the aftermath of the crisis, robust growth started to lift the Russian economy 
out of its trough, to raise productivity and wages and to reduce the extent and incidence of wage 
arrears. While the financial crisis had some severe consequences in the form of an upsurge in inflation 
and a collapse of a large part of the private banking sector, these consequences were very short-term 
and had little influence on the real economy. We also should stress that the short-lived nature of the 
crisis prevented the inflationary upsurge in August and September 1998 to be transformed into 
persistent inflationary pressures and that the crisis did not lead to a major reallocation of resources 
employed by the economy. In actual fact, in our firm but also in many other firms in industry we 
observe an increase in the capacity utilization of existing resources (Kapeliushnikov, 2005).     
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  The employees in this firm do not seem to influence wage and employment 
determination in ways that can partially shape gender earnings gaps within Russian 
firms. Employees could have this influence above all through two routes. First, 
corporate governance structures related to privatization and the distribution of shares 
have an impact on the process of how wages and employment are determined. The 
firm was founded in the early fifties of the last century and privatized in 1992.  A 
decade later, in 2002, more than half of the shares were owned by managers and 
employees still working in the firm. From published annual financial statements we, 
however, know that employees with shares have no voting rights and that the CEO 
and a few leading managers have a large enough chunk of voting shares to dominate 
all aspects of firm decision making, including wage and employment policies. There 
is also the possibility that large dividend payments, paid to a subset of employees and 
varying over time, could cause differential wage payments across the workforce. 
However, from the same published statements of the firm we can infer that annual 
dividend payments to employees are miniscule relative to annual total compensation.  
In essence, corporate governance structures in this firm neither give employees some 
direct influence over the wage setting process nor do they confound the levels and the 
differentiation of wages.  
Second, labor market institutions, in particular collective wage bargaining, 
might have a big impact on wage levels and wage differentials. So, how important are 
trade unions in this firm? From a second interview with the CEO that took place in 
April 2007 and from discussions with the director of human resources taking place 
earlier we can gather that, while there is collective bargaining at the firm on paper, 
trade union representatives have virtually no influence on wage policy. 7  
                                                 
7 That employees as share holders or through their trade union lack influence over wage setting can, for 
example, imply that discrimination against females based on employees’ tastes (Becker, 1957) does not 
come into play in this firm.  
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Our discussion consequently implies that wages are set unilaterally by top 
management, which is, however, influenced in its wage policies by local labor market 
conditions and the need to keep worker turnover at optimizing levels (Dohmen, 
Lehmann and Schaffer, 2007).  Given the dominance of top management it seems, 
therefore, only natural to directly ask the CEO how he sees the wage determination 
process. When asked what determines wages, the CEO pointed to the following 
determinants: (a) qualification of the employee; (b) work tenure/seniority and 
experience; (c) wage level in the region; (d) wage level in the sector; and (e) price of 
the order, to which worker is assigned. From the CEO’s declaration it transpires that 
there is no taste for discrimination on the part of this employer and a female employee 
with the same qualification, tenure and experience as her male counterpart should 
earn the same wage or receive the same total compensation.  As we shall see, this is 
far from so in this firm.  
 
 
3. Data and measurement issues  
 
We created an electronic file based on records from the personnel archive of the firm, 
and constructed a year-end panel data set for the years 1997 to 2002. We have records 
of all employees who were employed at any time during this period, except for top 
managers whose information is discarded for reasons of confidentiality. The data 
contain information on individuals’ demographic characteristics such as gender, age, 
marital status and number of children, on their educational attainment, retraining and 
other skill enhancement activities before joining the firm and during tenure at the 
firm. We also know the exact date when each employee started work at the firm as 
well as his/her complete working history before that date. In addition, we know 
whether someone worked full-time or part-time as well as a full-week or not. For 
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those who separated from the firm we can distinguish between a voluntary quit, 
transfer to another firm, individual dismissal, group dismissal and retirement.  
In Russian firms the workforce is often divided into five employee categories: 
administration (i.e. management) which we label “managers”; accounting and 
financial specialists whom we label “accountants”; engineering and technical 
specialists (including programmers) whom we subsume under the term “engineers”; 
primary and auxiliary production workers, whom we label “production workers”; and 
finally, service staff. The distribution of the workforce across these employee 
categories is shown in table 1 as are the shares of female workers in each category. 
We should note here that in this firm employees dealing with financial issues, i.e. 
“accountants”, are apart from 2 persons, all female, which means, of course, that we 
do not analyze an earnings gap for this type of employee category. It is also worth 
mentioning that, apart from the declining fraction of female service staff, the shares of 
female employees remain fairly constant between 1997 and 2002.  
For the years 1997 to 2002 we have monthly wages averaged over the year, 
and information on the three types of bonuses paid to the workforce: (1) a monthly 
bonus amounting to a fixed percentage of the wage; (2) an extra annual bonus whose 
level depends on “the results of the year” (i.e. this bonus is a form of profit sharing); 
(3) an annual bonus labeled “other bonus”. While production workers never receive a 
monthly bonus, the bonus labeled “other bonus” is paid to production workers only. 
Wages are reported by the firm as the employee's average monthly wage in rubles for 
the year (or fraction of the year, if not employed for the full 12 months), with no 
adjustment for inflation.  The monthly bonus is reported as a percentage of the 
average monthly wage, and the corresponding ruble figure is recovered by applying 
the percentage to the nominal monthly wage.  The other two bonuses are reported in 
nominal rubles.  The inflation rate in Russia during this period was irregular and 
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sometimes quite high - the price level more than doubled between the start of the 
financial crisis in July 1998 and April 1999, and was 0-2% per month before and after 
- and so some care is required to construct appropriate deflators.  Because nominal 
average monthly wage and the nominal monthly bonus are averages for the year, they 
are deflated into 1997 constant rubles using an annual average CPI, i.e., the average 
price level for the year relative to the average price level in 1997.  The other two 
bonuses are paid around the end of the year, and so these are converted into 1997 
constant rubles using the CPI price level for December of the corresponding year, i.e., 
the December price level in that year relative to the average 1997 price level.8 The 
shares of the monthly total compensation components are presented in table 2. 
The careful approach to generating real earnings sketched above and the fact 
that the earnings data are taken from the personnel records of the firm lead us to 
surmise that measurement error is minimal in these earnings data. At any rate, it is 
highly unlikely that there are systematic differences in the accuracy of the earnings 
data across the two genders that are responsible for the estimated gender earnings 
differentials.  
Among the firm’s workforce, production workers are subdivided into levels, 
primary production workers having eight and auxiliary production workers having six 
                                                 
8 We have available monthly data on CPI inflation in Russia overall and in the oblast where the firm is 
located.  In this paper we work primarily with average monthly wages, and so we compare average 
annual inflation in the oblast with national rates.  This shows that inflation in the oblast is very similar 
to national inflation:  
 
                 Russia     Oblast  
1997          15.4          14.0  
1998          38.1          38.7  
1999          98.6          97.9  
2000          20.8          20.4  
2001          21.6          19.1  
2002          16.0          14.5  
 
These indices are based on average monthly price levels calculated using monthly inflation rates. Over 
the 1997-2002 period the cumulative price indices diverge by less than 3%.  Results using wages and 
bonuses deflated by the national CPI are therefore essentially identical to those using the oblast 
CPI.  We use the former in what follows. 
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levels. Since we have these levels only for the cross section of 2002, we will perform 
decompositions for this cross section in order to see whether segregation into levels 
might be an important driving force of earnings and total compensation gaps in this 
firm.  
In the data set at hand no hours of work are recorded, hence we cannot 
calculate an hourly wage. The gap that we can identify is thus a gap in monthly wage 
earnings, most of which could be driven by differences in hours worked. To ensure 
that the earnings differential does not just reflect differences in hours worked we only 
include employees who always were full-time employees and worked every week a 
full week throughout 1997-2002. This leads to the exclusion of 14 percent of the 
firm’s employees from our analysis, but also increases our confidence that the 
identified earnings gap is not spurious.9       
 
4. Methods 
In order to document and to analyze the firm-level gender earnings gap in a Russian 
firm, we use well-known decomposition techniques. These decompositions that we 
perform for mean earnings are standard fare and, therefore, only briefly mentioned.  
We start with the traditional Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 
1973), which relies on estimating separately two Mincerian log earnings equations by 
gender. As is well known, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is subject to the so-
called “index number problem” and requires using either the male or female earnings 
structure as a non-discriminatory benchmark. To remedy this problem, Neumark 
(1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) advocate a pooled model for both genders 
using a weighted average of the female and male earnings structures.  
                                                 
9 The existence of overtime, which is only indirectly recorded in our data, does not allow us to impute 
hourly wages. 
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Decomposing the earnings gap at different quantiles of the earnings distribution using 
the Oaxaca-Blinder method can produce biased results.10 Their methodology is based 
on the OLS property that mean earnings conditional on average characteristics is 
equal to unconditional mean earnings, an assumption that does not hold in the context 
of quantile regression. In order to decompose the gender earnings gap at different 
quantiles we use the quantile decomposition technique proposed by Machado and 
Mata (2005). Denote by  the log of earnings of individual i with 
characteristics X who leaves behind a fraction 
)|(ln ii XwQθ
θ  of individuals with the same 
characteristics (Koenker and Basset, 1978). The earnings gap can then be decomposed 
as follows: 
residualXQXQ
XQXQwQwQ
fifmif
mifmimfm
+−+
+−=−
)]ˆ'()ˆ'([
)]ˆ'()ˆ'([)(ln)(ln
θθθθ
θθθθθθ
ββ
ββ
               (1)  
The first term on the right-hand-side shows the contribution of the differences in 
characteristics between males and females to the earnings gap at the quantile θ , and 
the second term presents the contribution due to differences in coefficients. The 
residual should disappear asymptotically as the sample is generated randomly. Note 
also that the usual “index number problem” is present in this decomposition and we 
use the earnings structure of males as a non-discriminatory benchmark. 
Practical implementation of this decomposition requires making B 
independent random draws of percentiles θ  and estimating B quantile regressions 
(here B=10,000) for each percentile θ  and for males and females separately: 
. Then, a random sample of size B is created from covariates 
X for each gender. Finally, the counterfactual and actual earnings distributions are 
generated for different combinations of genders. That is, the counterfactual earnings 
density  shows the log of earnings arising if women had their own 
θθ βiii XXwQ ')|(ln =
θβ mifi Xw ˆ'ln =
                                                 
10 See, for example, Felgueroso et al. (2007). 
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characteristics but were paid as men, while  shows a counterfactual 
earnings density that would arise if females were given males’ characteristics but 
were paid as females. Using the generated coefficients and characteristics, we 
estimate the earnings gaps at different quantiles of the constructed earnings 
distributions. 
θβ fimi Xw ˆ'ln =
 Finally, we also decompose changes in the earnings gap over the period 1997-
2002. First we perform the decompositions at the mean exploiting the well-known 
methodology originally proposed by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991) and applied by 
Brainerd (2000) and Reilly (1999) when analyzing changes in the Russian wage gap 
in the early years of transition. Second, we perform similar decompositions at the 
quantiles of the earnings distributions, generating intertemporal counterfactuals based 
on the methodology of Machado and Mata (2005).11
 
5. Results  
5.1. The gender earnings gap inside the firm: description 
The aftermath of the financial crisis saw a substantial rise in the consumer price index 
and a fall in real wages, both across the country and within our firm (Dohmen, 
Lehmann and Schaffer, 2007). Inspection of figure 1 leads to two obvious 
conclusions: (1) mean male earnings are larger than their female counterparts, and the 
mean earnings gap seems to decline as the probability mass linked to higher male 
earnings is reduced in 2002; (2) the gender-specific earnings distributions for all 
employees and for workers are shifted to the left over the period 1997 to 2002 and the 
distributions are more compressed in 2002.12 When we will discuss the reasons for the 
                                                 
11 In a transition context, the Machado-Mata (2005) methodology was also employed by Ganguli and 
Terrell (2005) who analyze the gender wage gap in Ukraine both within years and across time.  
12 The fall in earnings inequality is reflected in falling Gini coefficients of monthly wages and total 
compensation as shown in Dohmen, Lehmann and Schaffer (2008). The Gini coefficients reported in 
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decline in the earnings gap below, it will be relevant that inequality falls already in 
1998 and that the values of the Gini are always highest for the entire workforce and 
the employee categories in 1997.  
 Figure 2 traces the raw GEG for four employee categories and all employees 
in our firm over the years 1997 to 2002. Recalling that production workers make up 
roughly two thirds of all employees, it is clear from the figure that their GEG is 
driving the overall gender earnings differential. Apart from the polar years, engineers 
have the second highest earnings gap, which is, however, in most years roughly 30 
percentage points lower than that of production workers. The earnings gap of service 
workers exhibits a U-shaped curve, with gaps of roughly 20 percent in 1997 and 2002 
but hovering around zero during the rest of the period. Finally, managers have a very 
small raw gender earnings differential whose adjusted variant is not significant in any 
year.13 This result is in line with the predictions of Lazear and Rosen’s (1990) model 
that women, once finding themselves in high positions within the same firm, will not 
experience different treatment from that of men. 
The regressions, on which the adjusted gender earnings gaps of figures 3 and 4 
are based, are shown for the years 1997 and 2002 in table 3. These regressions point 
to the determinants of log real earnings at the mean and at several quantiles in the 
distributions. Apart from the gender dummy, which has a big and highly significant 
impact throughout, tenure and educational attainment as well as training outside the 
firm increase earnings, while studying in the firm and within-firm mobility, which is 
predominantly of a horizontal nature, depress them. Service workers have 
substantially lower, engineers somewhat lower earnings than production workers, 
while managers and accountants command an earnings premium on average. Another 
                                                                                                                                            
that paper corroborate the decline in inequality of monthly wages and total compensation for the entire 
workforce as well as for the five employee categories in the aftermath of the financial crisis.  
13 The regressions, which generate adjusted gender earnings gaps are not shown here but available on 
request from the authors.  
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specification includes an additional indicator variable which takes the value one for 
females with children (see columns (2) and (7)). This indicator variable is included in 
order to allow for a differential treatment of females with children by the tax 
authorities; but the variable would also pick up mothers’ propensity to trade off more 
flexible working conditions for lower earnings. For the year 1997 (as well as for the 
not shown years 1998 to 2001) this dummy is not significant, while in 2002 women 
with children encounter a wage penalty of 10 percentage points on average. The 
adjusted earnings gap is lowered by precisely this amount in this year.    
The total gender earnings gap in figure 3 rises slightly between 1997 and 
1998, when it reaches roughly 40 percent and then falls continuously to the level of 
around 18 percent in 2002. An Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition14 also produces the 
result that most of the GEG at the mean remains unexplained. The regressions by 
gender underlying the decompositions at the means as well as quantile regressions by 
gender at selected quantiles are shown for the years 1997 and 2002 in the appendix 
(tables A1 and A2). In many instances, they show inter-gender differences in the 
returns to many of the productivity measures employed in our regressions. To address 
the concern that the gender earnings gap might above all be a reflection of differences 
in hours worked, we also perform a “robustness check” by decomposing the GEG for 
workers using two earnings measures. As stated above, workers receive an “other 
bonus”; this bonus is paid to workers for additional effort (“completion of work ahead 
of plan”), but also because of overtime work and work during holidays and days off. 
The first measure is based on monthly wage earnings alone, while the second one 
includes in addition the imputed monthly fraction of the “other bonus” that could also 
reflect differences in productivity in a better way. The two decompositions of the 
                                                 
14 We have also performed Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca-Ransom (1994) decompositions in the earlier 
version of this paper. In general, the results were very similar to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and 
we decided to report the latter. 
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GEG, based on these two measures, are virtually identical. We are thus lead to believe 
that the GEG is not confounded by differences in hours worked across gender in a 
major way.   
The raw and adjusted earnings gaps across the distribution, shown for the year 
1997 in figure 4, are representative for the gaps in the years 1997 to 2001 that are not 
shown here, i.e., they show large differentials in the lower part of the distribution 
while in the upper part these differentials decline. Contrary to previous years, the 
gender earnings gap is increasing over the distribution from close to zero to about 20 
percent.15 What is also striking from this figure is that the gap is approximately 15-20 
percent at the highest quantiles in both years even after having controlled for 
employee type, which suggests the persistence of the “glass ceiling” effect across 
years. 
Figure 5 and table 4 that reproduce results from Machado-Mata 
decompositions of the gender earnings differentials across the 1997 and 2002 
distributions make the point that differences in returns to characteristics and not 
characteristics themselves contribute to the GEG across the whole distributions. Note 
also that while the GEG is lower in 2002 than in 1997, the proportion of the 
unexplained part is larger in 2002 almost across the whole distribution.   
 
5.2 The gender earnings gap inside the firm: potential explanations 
Having described the size of the gender earnings gap both at the mean and at various 
quantiles, and having explored the development of the gender earnings gap over time 
we now turn to the question of  what can explain the gender earnings gap inside our 
firm? The data that we have at our disposal allow us to look at the following three 
                                                 
15Results that are based on the specification with the interaction term female-children are very similar 
to those in figure 4, although the adjusted gap at several quantiles is somewhat lower. These results are 
not shown here but available on request. 
 18
potential explanations: the trade-off between premia and wage earnings, the trade-off 
between secure jobs and wages and segregation into job levels for workers in the year 
2002. Of course, discrimination or selection may also serve as potential reasons. 
 It is conceivable that as premia make up a substantial part of total earnings, 
women are willing to accept lower wages in return for larger premia. Comparing 
figure 6 where we show the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of total compensation 
with the decomposition of wage earnings in figure 3 it is pretty clear, though, that the 
magnitudes and the evolution over time of the two gaps are pretty similar. Also in 
both cases most of the gap remains unexplained. A second explanation for different 
pay for female and male employees with similar observable characteristics could lie in 
the fact that women trade job security for lower wage earnings. Probit regressions that 
estimate the probability of quitting or being laid off, which are not shown here, 
demonstrate, however, that women have a 3 percentage points higher probability to 
quit and are also slightly more likely to be laid off by the firm, evidence that 
contradicts the hypothesis of a trade-off between wages and job security. 
 As shown above, production workers make up the bulk of the firm’s 
workforce and also experience by far the largest gender earnings gap. It is, therefore, 
worthwhile to take a closer look at the issue whether female workers are segregated 
into low-paying job levels while men find themselves in levels of higher pay. 
Unfortunately, currently we have information on levels only for the year 2002 and can 
only ascertain the position of a production worker in the level structure at the end of 
the period.   
Table 5 provides evidence of female production workers being predominantly 
confined to the lower job levels in the firm. Nearly all female production workers find 
themselves in the auxiliary levels. Only in the job level primary 4 can we observe a 
statistically significant gender earnings gap (in the level primary 5 it is significant at 
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the 10% level), while in all other job levels average pay is the same for female and 
male production workers. So, women finding themselves in the same job levels as 
men are for the most part not discriminated against in terms of pay in this firm. The 
GEG for production workers in 2002 of roughly 30 percent comes, however, about 
because women have an overwhelmingly lower probability to find themselves in 
primary job levels even when we control for observable productivity characteristics. 
This is made abundantly clear in table 6: in the most parsimonious specification 
women have a probability to be in a primary job level that is 84 percentage points 
lower than that of their male counterparts. Even women with university education are 
far less likely to be in a primary job level if they happen to be engaged in production 
at the shop floor. In addition, the Fairlie decomposition shows that only 11 percent of 
the difference in the predicted probabilities of being in a primary level is explained by 
observed characteristics.16  
Wage earnings and job levels are, of course, highly correlated. This high 
correlation can be seen when we perform Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions of gender 
earnings and total compensation gaps. When we condition on job levels, the entire 
gaps are explained now (table 7). Thus, there is no scope for gender discrimination 
within a job level. Comparing Machado-Mata decompositions of gender earnings 
differentials at the quantiles with and without conditioning on job levels leads to the 
same conclusion: earnings differentials across job levels are large and little of the 
earnings differential is explained by characteristics, while earnings differentials within 
job levels are much smaller and virtually entirely explained by observed 
characteristics at all quantiles (see figure 7). Of course, we are aware of the 
endogeneity of job levels in the determination of earnings and consequently do not 
                                                 
16 This evidence is consistent with Ransom and Oaxaca (2005) who find that within job levels in a US 
grocery store men and women are paid the same, but the lower job assignment of women could not be 
completely explained by individual characteristics. 
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suggest that job levels have a causal impact on the gender earnings differential.17 
Nevertheless, our descriptive exercise points to the remarkable fact that there is such a 
large earnings differential in spite of a seemingly gender neutral wage policy of top 
management in this firm, which arises because women are in overwhelming numbers 
placed in low paying job levels (cf. Ransom and Oaxaca, 2005). So far, we only 
observe the job level of each production workers at the end of the reported period and 
can thus only point to the high correlation of placement into job levels and gender 
earnings differentials. In future work, once we have data on the evolution of job levels 
for each production worker, we will analyze whether there are important gender 
differences in promotion rates and in entry-level jobs. 
 
5.3 Changes in the gender earnings gap over time and their potential reasons 
The 20 percentage points decrease in the gender wage gap between 1997 and 2002 is 
decomposed in table 8. About 28 percent of the decrease can be explained by 
observables, with changes in observed characteristics being about four times as 
important as changes in observed prices. The unobserved factors are nearly of equal 
importance. About 6 points of the reduction of the gap comes about because women 
improve their position in the male residual wage distribution while about 8 points are 
due to a narrowing of this distribution. While this last factor has the most weight, the 
other factors are jointly more important.18 That the rise or fall in inequality has little 
impact on movements of the gender earnings gap in our firm can also be seen by the 
above mentioned fact that the gap rose between 1997 and 1998 while inequality fell 
between the two years.  
                                                 
17 It is possible that the gender difference in occupational distribution partly reflects employment 
discrimination or unequal occupational access. If it does, then it cannot be used to “explain” the GWG 
(see, for example, Kidd and Schannon, 1996 and Rodgers, 2006).  
18 In contrast, in the early years of transition when the Russian gender wage gap increased dramatically, 
Brainerd (2000) finds that the widening of the residual male wage distribution completely overwhelms 
and cancels out the first three factors that all have a slightly negative impact on the change of the wage 
differential in the data that she analyzes. 
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In table 9 we compare the earnings gaps of 2002 and 1997 across the 
distribution and perform several counterfactual exercises over time, following 
Ganguli and Terrell (2005). This enables us to document whether changes in the 
characteristics of men and women or changes in the returns to these characteristics at 
specific points in the distributions contributed to the fall in the gap between 1997 and 
2002. As we can see from row (3) the raw gap fell more at the bottom than at the top 
of the distribution (see also Figure 4). The first counterfactual, denoted gap 1, asks 
what the gap would have been if women in 2002 had the characteristics of the female 
group that we observe in 1997. Row (6) shows that the gap would have fallen at the 
bottom but would have remained almost the same throughout the rest of the 
distribution. Hence, women’s characteristics at the bottom were better in 1997 than 
they were in 2002, but this does not hold in the rest of the distribution. The 
deteriorating characteristics at the bottom do not help us explain the falling gap, 
though.   
The second counterfactual experiment (gap 2) asks what the gap would have 
looked like if in 2002 the returns to women’s characteristics had been those of 1997 
(row 7). Under this counterfactual scenario, the gap would have been negative at the 
top, i.e. women would have fared better than men, and would have risen a lot at the 
bottom (row 9). Thus a large increase in the “prices” of women’s characteristics at the 
bottom is an explanation of the larger fall of the gender earnings gap at the bottom. 
We perform the same counterfactual experiments for men. Their  results can be 
briefly summarized as follows. At the 10th decile men’s characteristics were slightly 
better in 1997 than in 2002 and worsening of those characteristics contributed to a fall 
in the gap to a small extent. Returns to men’s characteristics, on the other hand, 
declined between 1997 and 2002 and contributed to the reduction in the gap 
throughout the distribution, although this reduction was higher in the upper part. The 
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upshot of table 9 is, at any rate, that a substantial increase in the rewards for women’s 
characteristics at the bottom - together with a slight worsening of male characteristics 
– generates the larger fall of the gender earnings gap in this part of the distribution.     
Another candidate behind the evolution of gender earnings gap in Russia 
pointed out in the literature is wage arrears. Kazakova (2007) and Gerry, Kim and Lee 
(2004) moot that because of social considerations by firms low paid female 
employees see an improvement in the payment culture relative to low paid male 
employees, thus the gap increases. In our firm data, we only have wage arrears at the 
end of 1998 when they were at a peak. However, relative to the country at large wage 
arrears were of minor importance in the firm and workers, where we see the largest 
GEG, actually had on average only 0.05 months of 1997 wages withheld while in the 
Russian economy the average worker was confronted with a stock of wage arrears 
amounting to 2 months of 1997 wages (Lehmann and Wadsworth, 2007).  
Furthermore, Dohmen, Lehmann and Schaffer (2008) find no gender difference in the 
incidence of wage arrears for all employees, while they find a lower incidence for 
male production workers and for female engineers. This latter fact helps explain the 
rise of the earnings gap that we observe in table 10 when we go from the whole 
workforce to the sub-sample of employees paid in full and the small fall when we 
proceed in the same way with production workers only. Table 10 also shows similar 
decomposition results for the entire groups and the sub-samples of those paid in full. 
It is at any rate clear that the fall over the entire period has nothing to do with wage 
arrears since after 1999 this firm has no problems in paying all its employees in full 
and on time.      
 A falling gender earnings gap could be caused by the withdrawal of poorly 
qualified and low paid female employees as was demonstrated by Hunt (2002) for 
former East-Germany. We, therefore, perform probit regressions that estimate the 
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probability of separations. Table 11 finds similar results as Dohmen, Lehmann and 
Schaffer (2008) who estimated the hazard rate from employment using a Cox 
proportional hazard model. Controlling for a large number of observable 
characteristics employees who find themselves at the beginning of the reported period 
in low deciles of the employee category specific earnings distribution have the highest 
propensity to separate from the firm. However, females finding themselves in the 
lower part of these distributions are actually less likely to separate from the firm. Thus 
changes in the composition of the female workforce do not seem to be behind the 
falling gender earnings gap. We should not that this result also holds in the 
specification that includes a female-children interaction dummy. 
 Thus far we have only looked at separations in order to explain the change in 
the composition of the workforce throughout the distribution. For a complete 
assessment it is important to also characterize new entrants into the firm. Since we 
have no information about the population from which these new entrants are drawn 
we cannot perform regressions that estimate the probability of being hired. Cross 
tabulations, however, can be used to compare the characteristics of new entrants with 
the characteristics of incumbents. These tabulations19 show that in all years for males 
and females alike the new entrants have slightly “worse” characteristics (e.g. they are 
slightly less educated) than the incumbents. We can take this as evidence that the 
average “quality” of the stock of female employees does not improve over time 
because of new hires. In addition, the tabulations show that the change in the 
composition that we stipulate for male employees in the lower part of the distribution 
is also not driven by hirings.    
In summary, the only explanation that seems to hold up comes out of the inter-
temporal counterfactuals that are based on the Machado-Mata method: male 
                                                 
19 They are not shown here but available upon request. 
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employees with relatively good characteristics finding themselves in the lowest part 
of the distribution at the beginning of the period seem to have separated more 
frequently from the firm. But most importantly, an increase in the rewards to female 
characteristics, which is particularly prevalent in the lower part of the distribution, 
seems to be the main driving force behind the falling gender earnings gap.       
 
6. Conclusions          
We have analyzed the size of the gender earnings gap and its determinants and 
development over time using data from a large Russian firm. The results show that the 
estimates of the gender earnings gap at the firm level are very similar in magnitude to 
estimates of the gender gap in the economy at large. Moreover, the development of 
the gender earnings differential over time also mirrors developments in the Russian 
economy. Observed characteristics that are related to individual productivity only 
explain a small fraction of the gender earnings gap. The narrowing of the gap at the 
firm level is partly driven by gender differences in separation patterns. In particular, 
men who are in the lower part of the residual wage distribution but have relatively 
favorable observed characteristics are more likely to separate, most likely because 
they face better outside alternatives. Women in the lower end of the wage distribution 
have lower separation rates. This is likely the result of an increase in the rewards to 
female characteristics, which is particularly prevalent in the lower part of the 
distribution. Our estimates indicate that this increase in the rewards for women is the 
main driving force behind the falling gender earnings gap.   
Importantly, our analysis reveals that the gender earnings gap is largely driven 
by job assignment rather than by earnings differentials within a particular job level. 
For production workers, we have shown that earnings differentials conditional on the 
job level are small to start with and almost entirely explained by observed 
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characteristics related to productivity. Future work has to clarify whether gender 
differences in job assignment stem from differences in unobserved productivity 
differences or from discrimination in initial job assignment or subsequent promotion 
chances. 
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Figure 1 - Kernel densities of real earnings by gender, 1997 and 2002 
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Source: Earnings records form personnel data set. 
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Figure 2 - Raw gender earnings gap by employee category  
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Figure 3 – Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of gender earnings gap 
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Note: Controls include tenure (its square and cube), age (its square and cube), 
education dummies, marital status, dummies for having one or more than one child, 
dummies for training outside firm, internal mobility, within-firm training and 
employee category dummies. 
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Figure 4 - Raw and adjusted earnings gaps at quantiles: 1997 and 2002  
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Notes: Coefficient on male dummy is reported from the quantile regressions without 
and with controls, respectively. Controls include tenure (its square and cube), age (its 
square and cube), education dummies, marital status, dummies for having one or more 
than one child, dummies for training outside firm, internal mobility, within-firm 
training and employee category dummies. 
 
 
Figure 5 - Machado-Mata earnings gap decompositions at quantiles: 1997 and 
2002 
 
1997 2002 
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
0 20 40 60 80 100
percentile
gap_total gap_second
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
0 20 40 60 80 100
percentile
gap_total gap_second
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32
 
 
 
Figure 6 – Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of gender gap in total compensation: 
1997 to 2002 
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Note: Controls include tenure (its square and cube), age (its square and cube), 
education dummies, marital status, dummies for having one or more than one child, 
dummies for training outside firm, internal mobility, within-firm training and 
employee category dummies. 
 
 
Figure 7 - Machado-Mata decompositions for workers 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 - Composition of workforce (in %), 1997 to 2002 
 
Year 
Service 
staff Engineers
Production 
workers Accountants Managers Total 
Absolute 
number of 
employees
1997 
 
4.8 
(40.7) 
26.7 
(55.0) 
61.6 
(30.8) 
2.6 
(97.3) 
4.2 
(17.1) 
100 
(38.9) 
2,898 
 
1998 
 
4.6 
(35.3) 
26.0 
(55.0) 
62.5 
(29.1) 
2.5 
(97.2) 
4.4 
(19.2) 
100 
(37.4) 
2,937 
 
1999 
 
4.8 
(35.3) 
26.7 
(53.7) 
62.1 
(31.8) 
2.3 
(97.0) 
4.2 
(20.0) 
100 
(38.8) 
2,863 
 
2000 
 
5.1 
(34.2) 
27.1 
(54.2) 
61.4 
(30.3) 
2.2 
(96.9) 
4.2 
(21.0) 
100 
(38.1) 
2,866 
 
2001 
 
5.0 
(34.2) 
26.4 
(53.5) 
62.1 
(31.0) 
2.5 
(97.3) 
4.0 
(21.0) 
100 
(38.3) 
2,962 
 
2002 
 
5.2 
(32.5) 
25.7 
(52.9) 
63.1 
(30.9) 
2.2 
(96.9) 
3.9 
(21.4) 
100 
(37.7) 
2,974 
 
Notes: fulltime, full-week only and non-missing wages and explanatory variables. 
Percent in brackets are shares of females in employee category (in%).  
 
 
 
Table 2 - Shares of monthly total compensation components 
 
Year Monthly 
Wage 
Monthly 
Bonus 
Extra 
Bonus 
Other 
Bonus 
Average 
monthly 
compensation
1997 0.830 0.080 0.051 0.039 1.635 
1998 0.916 0.059 0.000 0.025 1.559 
1999 0.870 0.066 0.043 0.021 1.131 
2000 0.854 0.066 0.042 0.038 1.165 
2001 0.797 0.081 0.098 0.025 1.315 
2002 0.776 0.095 0.088 0.041 1.395 
Notes: whole initial sample. Average monthly compensation is given in thousand of 
1997 rubles. See text for definitions.
Table 3 - Determinants of log real earnings: 1997 and 2002 
 
           (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
 1997 2002 
     OLS Quantile Regressions OLS Quantile Regressions
     
         
 10th   50th 90th  10th  50th 90th
Female -0.328*** -0.300*** -0.344*** -0.388*** -0.144*** -0.170*** -0.069* -0.076*** -0.203*** -0.207***
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(0.081) (0.048) (0.020) (0.016) (0.012) (0.041) (0.020) (0.013) (0.014)
Tenure
 
0.029*** 0.029*** 0.033* 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.011 0.010** 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Tenure squared /100 
 
-0.146** -0.146** -0.116 -0.146** -0.158** -0.074** -0.074** -0.062 -0.023 -0.013
(0.071) (0.071) (0.139) (0.069) (0.064) (0.037) (0.037) (0.053) (0.036) (0.039)
Tenure cubed/1000
 
0.028 0.027 0.017 0.025 0.029* 0.014** 0.014** 0.017* 0.003 0.002
(0.017) (0.017) (0.030) (0.016) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008)
Age
 
0.030 0.031 0.019 0.062 0.009 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.119*** 0.052** 0.055**
(0.043) (0.043) (0.085) (0.040) (0.038) (0.021) (0.021) (0.037) (0.024) (0.023)
Age squared/100 
 
-0.015 -0.018 0.018 -0.090 0.024 -0.176*** -0.176*** -0.275*** -0.101* -0.118**
(0.113) (0.114) (0.230) (0.106) (0.103) (0.053) (0.053) (0.092) (0.060) (0.058)
Age cubed/1000 
 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.005 0.003 -0.005 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.021*** 0.006 0.009* 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Basic professional
 
0.019 0.019 0.031 0.005 0.001 0.040** 0.040** 0.078** 0.007 0.041*
(0.033) (0.033) (0.070) (0.031) (0.025) (0.020) (0.020) (0.032) (0.020) (0.021)
Secondary general
 
0.074** 0.074** 0.177*** 0.049* 0.040* 0.046** 0.047** 0.056* 0.040** 0.012
(0.031) (0.031) (0.067) (0.029) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) (0.030) (0.020) (0.021)
Secondary professional 
 
0.083** 0.084** 0.212*** 0.027 0.024 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.116*** 0.040* 0.007 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.073) (0.032) (0.026) (0.021) (0.021) (0.033) (0.021) (0.023)
Higher incomplete
 
0.174*** 0.175*** 0.322** 0.162** 0.074 0.064 0.064 0.075 0.051 0.041
(0.063) (0.063) (0.159) (0.072) (0.055) (0.040) (0.040) (0.067) (0.050) (0.051)
Higher  
 
0.094** 0.094** 0.118 0.088** 0.050 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.085** 0.075*** 0.062** 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.090) (0.040) (0.031) (0.024) (0.024) (0.040) (0.026) (0.027)
Single
 
0.028 0.028 -0.183 0.039 0.114* -0.006 0.057 -0.034 -0.047 0.132***
(0.077) (0.077) (0.158) (0.072) (0.060) (0.034) (0.041) (0.057) (0.043) (0.042)
Divorced or widowed 
 
0.012 0.012 0.097 -0.030 -0.015 -0.062*** -0.060*** -0.040 -0.062*** -0.022
(0.032) (0.032) (0.084) (0.037) (0.030) (0.021) (0.021) (0.034) (0.023) (0.024)
One child
 
-0.013 0.001 -0.135 0.024 0.042 0.037 0.120*** -0.027 0.045 0.072*
(0.056) (0.065) (0.121) (0.054) (0.045) (0.028) (0.043) (0.054) (0.037) (0.037)
More than one child 
 
0.050 0.063 -0.034 0.098* 0.047 0.049 0.131*** -0.057 0.084** 0.110*** 
(0.059) (0.067) (0.129) (0.058) (0.048) (0.032) (0.045) (0.060) (0.040) (0.041)
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Training outside
 
0.175*** 0.176*** 0.033 0.185*** 0.136*** 0.108*** 0.107*** 0.062 0.097*** 0.056*
(0.036) (0.036) (0.099) (0.045) (0.036) (0.025) (0.025) (0.044) (0.028) (0.029)
Mobility in the firm 
 
-0.019 -0.019 0.035 -0.041* -0.023 -0.059*** -0.060*** -0.103*** -0.051*** -0.011
(0.020) (0.020) (0.048) (0.021) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) (0.015) (0.016)
Training in the firm 
 
-0.063*** -0.063*** -0.106** -0.037 -0.061*** -0.172*** -0.170*** -0.180*** -0.197*** -0.124***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.053) (0.023) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) (0.015) (0.015)
Service staff
 
-0.759*** -0.759*** -0.747*** -0.782*** -0.845*** -0.656*** -0.654*** -0.534*** -0.779*** -0.517***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.097) (0.043) (0.035) (0.029) (0.029) (0.041) (0.027) (0.028)
Engineers
 
-0.097*** -0.097*** 0.043 -0.106*** -0.170*** -0.074*** -0.072*** -0.014 -0.123*** 0.003
(0.030) (0.030) (0.071) (0.032) (0.025) (0.018) (0.018) (0.033) (0.021) (0.022)
Accountants
 
0.335*** 0.334*** 0.635*** 0.334*** 0.022 0.063* 0.067* 0.080 0.055 0.128***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.138) (0.064) (0.050) (0.035) (0.035) (0.072) (0.044) (0.043)
Managers
 
0.598*** 0.597*** 0.930*** 0.530*** 0.434*** 0.626*** 0.628*** 0.930*** 0.546*** 0.564***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.109) (0.054) (0.042) (0.023) (0.024) (0.051)
 
(0.036) (0.039)
Female*child
 
-0.030 -0.108**
(0.082) (0.043)
Constant
 
-0.571 -0.598 -1.187 -0.892* 0.270 -1.164*** -1.257*** -1.975*** -0.765** -0.567*
(0.510)
 
(0.519) (1.003) (0.469) (0.452)
 
(0.263) (0.271) (0.461) (0.297) (0.290)
 Observations 2898 2974
R-squared 0.34 0.34 0.47 0.47
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 4 – Machado-Mata decompositions at quantiles: 1997 and 2002 
 
Total gap Characteristics Coefficients Quantiles 
1997 
.45133013 .05959117 .39173895 10 
.39865917 .07281144 .32584774 20 
.42273125 .08751296 .33521828 30 
.44319141 .08621418 .35697722 40 
.43860713 .08154166 .35706547 50 
.41059321 .08013994 .33045328 60 
.34895301 .07761902 .27133399 70 
.27671921 .07339215 .20332706 80 
.20676935 .09197748 .11479187 90 
2002 
.02773124 -.05076087 .07849211 10 
.07009143 -.03487897 .1049704 20 
.12030653 -.00410482 .12441134 30 
.15570661 .00364733 .15205927 40 
.18806872 .01494379 .17312492 50 
.21567264 .01650028 .19917236 60 
.24022534 .01897711 .22124824 70 
.23481525 .02055669 .21425857 80 
.20537001 .03721231 .1681577 90 
 
Table 5 – Segregation into levels of production workers by gender for 2002 
 Males Females Gap 
Auxilliary 1 n.a. 0.459 
(0.118) 
n.a. 
 [1.00] 
Auxilliary 2 n.a. 0.642 
(0.218) 
n.a. 
 [1.00] 
Auxilliary 3 0.738 
(0.172) 
0.726 
(0.143) 
0.012 
(0.029) 
 [0.85] 
Auxilliary 4 0.796 
(0.154) 
0 .795 
(0.159) 
0 .001 
(0 .059) 
 [0.90] 
Auxilliary 5 1.028 
(0.147) 
1.020 
(0.128) 
0.008 
(0.021) 
 [0.83] 
Auxilliary 6 1.260 
(0.475) 
1.267 
(0.335) 
-0.007 
(0.324) 
 [0.67] 
Primary 1 0.466 
(0.075) 
n.a. n.a. 
 [0] 
Primary 2 0.803 
(0.205) 
0.857 
(0.146) 
-0.054 
(0.065) 
 [0.04] 
Primary 3 1.053 
(0.248) 
1.143 
(0.207) 
-0.090 
(0.056) 
 [0.04] 
Primary 4 1.284 
(0.223) 
1.131 
(0.343) 
0.153*** 
(0.056) 
 [0.08] 
Primary 5 1.429 
(0.148) 
1.326 
(0.153) 
0.103* 
(0.062) 
 [0.03] 
Primary 6 1.605 
(0.153) 
n.a. n.a. 
 [0] 
Primary 7 1.622 
(0.167) 
n.a. n.a. 
 [0] 
Primary 8 1.630 
(0.035) 
n.a. n.a. 
 [0] 
Notes: Table shows means (standard deviations) of monthly wages in each level by 
gender, difference (standard errors) across gender and the proportion of women in 
each level [in square brackets]. * difference is significant at 10%; *** difference is 
significant at 1%. 
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Table 6 – Probability for production workers to be in a primary level in 2002 
and Fairlie decomposition 
 
Total difference: 0.836 
Explained part: 0.091 
[10.89%] 
 Probit, marginal effects Contribution 
of: 
Female -0.836*** -0.900*** -0.923***  
 (0.017) (0.057) (0.024)  
Tenure  0.005 0.005 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009) 
Tenure squared /100 0.242** 0.239** 0.303** 0.176*** 
 (0.116) (0.117) (0.123) (0.019) 
Tenure cubed /1000 -0.062*** -0.062** -0.073*** -0.152*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) 
Age  -0.121** -0.127** -0.117** 0.388*** 
 (0.056) (0.059) (0.058) (0.041) 
Age squared /100 0.288** 0.301** 0.277* -0.140*** 
 (0.140) (0.147) (0.145) (0.013) 
Age cubed /1000 -0.022** -0.023** -0.021* -0.249*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.035) 
Basic professional 0.141*** 0.142*** 0.135*** 0.007 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.042) (0.005) 
Secondary general 0.260*** 0.262*** 0.253*** 0.017*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.039) (0.004) 
Secondary professional 0.184*** 0.185*** 0.170*** -0.002 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.041) (0.002) 
Higher incomplete 0.168*** 0.168***   
 (0.030) (0.031)   
Higher 0.188*** 0.192*** 0.023 0.00002 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.089) (0.002) 
Single  0.263*** 0.268*** 0.281*** 0.050** 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.020) 
Divorced or widowed 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.127*** -0.002* 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.042) (0.001) 
One child 0.681*** 0.667*** 0.703*** 0.029** 
 (0.099) (0.112) (0.089) (0.012) 
More than 1 child  0.324*** 0.325*** 0.346*** -0.031** 
 (0.030) (0.033) (0.031) (0.014) 
Training outside 0.208*** 0.211*** 0.224***  
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.037)  
Mobility in the firm -0.097** -0.094* -0.101** -0.001 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.051) (0.001) 
Training in the firm 0.107*** 0.105*** 0.120***  
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.033)  
Female*Child  0.138   
  (0.137)   
Female* Basic professional   0.138*  
   (0.073)  
Female* Secondary professional   0.167***  
   (0.064)  
Female* Secondary general   0.177***  
   (0.062)  
Female*Higher   0.255***  
   (0.021)  
Observations 1876 1876 1861  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. 
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Table 7 – Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions of production workers’ earnings and 
total compensation with levels included:  2002 
 
Monthly Wages 
Total difference 0.228*** 
(0.016) 
Explained 0.222*** 
(0.025) 
Unexplained 0.007 
(0.026) 
Total compensation 
Total difference 0.196*** 
(0.017) 
Explained 0.199*** 
(0.028) 
Unexplained -0.003 
(0.028) 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 - JMP decomposition of the change in the gender earnings differential: 
1997-2002 
Decomposition Men as a 
benchmark 
group 
Pooled 
 
Total change in gender gap 
 
-0.199 
Explained part 
[in % of total] 
-0.057 
[28.64%] 
-0.057 
[28.64%] 
due to:   
- observed characteristics (1) -0.047 -0.044 
- observed prices (2) -0.010 -0.013 
Unexplained part 
[in % of total] 
-0.142 
[71.36%] 
-0.142 
[71.36%] 
due to:   
- gap effect (3) -0.062 -0.054 
- earnings dispersion / unobserved prices (4) -0.080 -0.089 
Sum gender-specific: (1)+(3) -0.109 -0.098 
Sum earnings structure: (2)+(4) -0.090 -0.102 
Note: Controls include tenure (its square and cube), age (its square and cube), 
education dummies, marital status, dummies for having one or more than one child, 
interaction of child and female dummies, dummies for training outside firm, internal 
mobility and within-firm training. 
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Table 9 – Machado-Mata intertemporal counterfactuals: 1997 to 2002 
 
Gap 10 25 50 75 90 
Actual:      
(1) Gap actual 20021  0.060 0.125 0.196 0.254 0.216 
(2) Gap actual 19971  0.485 0.375 0.436 0.322 0.228 
(3) actual 2002 / actual 1997 0.124 0.350 0.450 0.789 0.947 
 
Counterfactual for women:      
(4) Gap 1 =  97020202 ffmm XX ββ − 0.045 0.117 0.195 0.245 0.232 
(5) (4) / (2) 0.093 0.328 0.447 0.761 1.018 
(6) (5) / (3) 0.750 0.936 0.995 0.965 1.074 
(7) Gap 2 =  02970202 ffmm XX ββ − 0.364 0.238 0.103 -0.073 -0.187 
(8) (7) / (2) 0.751 0.667 0.236 -0.227 -0.820 
(9) (8) / (3) 6.067 1.904 0.526 -0.287 -0.866 
Counterfactual for men:      
(10) Gap 3 =  02029702 ffmm XX ββ − 0.062 0.122 0.193 0.240 0.217 
(11) (10) / (2) 0.128 0.342 0.443 0.745 0.952 
(12) (11) / (3) 1.033 0.976 0.985 0.945 1.005 
(13) Gap 4 =  02020297 ffmm XX ββ − 0.102 0.291 0.498 0.608 0.620 
(14) (13) / (2) 0.210 0.815 1.142 1.888 2.719 
(15) (14) / (3) 1.700 2.328 2.541 2.394 2.870 
 
Note: 1 The actual gap is the coefficient on the male dummy in the quantile regressions without 
covariates.  
 
 
 
 
Table 10 – Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions of earnings for whole sample 
(including those with wage arrears) and those paid in full: 1998 
 
 
 Whole sample Paid in full 
 All employess 
Total differential 0.386*** 
(0.017) 
0.444*** 
(0.032) 
Unexplained gap 0.276*** 
(0.017) 
[71.50%] 
0.355*** 
(0.032) 
[79.95%] 
 Workers 
Total differential 0.461*** 
(0.023) 
0.445*** 
(0.032) 
Unexplained gap 0.409*** 
(0.023) 
[88.72%] 
0.353*** 
(0.033) 
[79.33%] 
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Table 11 - Probability of separations, pooled 1997-2002: Probit marginal effects  
 
 (1) (2) 
Female 0.248*** 0.167*** 
 (0.031) (0.048) 
Female*child  0.082** 
  (0.039) 
Tenure  -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Tenure squared /100 0.009 0.008 
 (0.032) (0.032) 
Tenure cubed/1000 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Age  0.098*** 0.094*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
Age squared/100 -0.312*** -0.303*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) 
Age cubed/1000 0.030*** 0.029*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Basic professional 0.309*** 0.309*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) 
Secondary general 0.035** 0.035** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Secondary professional 0.206*** 0.206*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
Higher incomplete 0.281*** 0.280*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) 
Higher  0.207*** 0.206*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) 
Single  -0.175*** -0.182*** 
 (0.019) (0.017) 
Divorced or widowed -0.083*** -0.084*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
One child -0.371*** -0.418*** 
 (0.030) (0.035) 
More than one child -0.249*** -0.269*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Training outside -0.018 -0.018 
 (0.024) (0.024) 
Mobility in the firm -0.109*** -0.108*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Training in the firm -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
Service staff -0.220*** -0.220*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Engineers -0.314*** -0.313*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
Managers -0.178*** -0.177*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Accountants -0.042 -0.041 
 (0.027) (0.027) 
1998 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
1999 -0.036*** -0.036*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
2000 -0.095*** -0.095*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
2001 -0.137*** -0.137*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
1st decile 0.232*** 0.233*** 
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 (0.032) (0.032) 
2nd decile 0.218*** 0.218*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) 
3rd decile 0.212*** 0.212*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) 
4th decile 0.119*** 0.119*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) 
6th decile 0.085*** 0.085*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) 
7th decile 0.018 0.018 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
8th decile 0.056** 0.056** 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
9th decile 0.127*** 0.127*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) 
10th decile 0.169*** 0.171*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) 
female* 1st decile  -0.196*** -0.196*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) 
female* 2nd decile -0.176*** -0.176*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) 
female* 3rd decile -0.194*** -0.194*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) 
female* 4th decile -0.142*** -0.140*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) 
female* 6th decile -0.000 0.001 
 (0.040) (0.040) 
female* 7th decile -0.049 -0.050 
 (0.035) (0.035) 
female* 8th decile -0.067** -0.067** 
 (0.034) (0.034) 
female* 9th decile -0.167*** -0.167*** 
 (0.025) (0.024) 
female* 10th decile -0.176*** -0.177*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
Observations 13098 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. Deciles given are deciles in employee category specific wage distributions. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1 - OLS and quantile regressions by gender, 1997 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Males Females 
 OLS Quantile Regressions OLS Quantile Regressions 
  10th 50th 90th  10th 50th 90th 
Tenure  0.023** 0.024 0.016* 0.028*** 0.017 -0.031* 0.034* 0.016* 
 (0.010) (0.023) (0.009) (0.006) (0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (0.009) 
Tenure squared / 100 -0.100 -0.047 -0.073 -0.159*** -0.101 0.472*** -0.166 -0.157* 
 (0.079) (0.179) (0.074) (0.048) (0.144) (0.147) (0.190) (0.083) 
Tenure cubed / 1000 0.016 0.001 0.014 0.025** 0.026 -0.142*** 0.021 0.047** 
 (0.017) (0.038) (0.017) (0.011) (0.039) (0.033) (0.048) (0.019) 
Age  -0.040 -0.022 0.017 -0.024 0.151* 0.038 0.161 0.144** 
 (0.055) (0.125) (0.047) (0.036) (0.084) (0.074) (0.105) (0.061) 
Age squared /100 0.170 0.144 0.039 0.110 -0.357 -0.079 -0.388 -0.305* 
 (0.145) (0.330) (0.123) (0.095) (0.232) (0.206) (0.295) (0.170) 
Age cubed / 1000 -0.018 -0.017 -0.008 -0.012 0.029 0.006 0.032 0.021 
 (0.012) (0.028) (0.010) (0.008) (0.021) (0.019) (0.027) (0.015) 
Basic professional -0.009 -0.013 -0.022 0.011 0.079 0.052 0.117 0.010 
 (0.039) (0.085) (0.033) (0.023) (0.061) (0.071) (0.080) (0.038) 
Secondary general 0.057 0.116 0.020 0.046** 0.072 0.016 0.062 0.037 
 (0.035) (0.078) (0.031) (0.021) (0.064) (0.074) (0.081) (0.039) 
Secondary professional 0.012 0.020 -0.027 0.030 0.228*** 0.195*** 0.204** 0.169*** 
 (0.039) (0.088) (0.034) (0.023) (0.065) (0.073) (0.086) (0.043) 
Higher incomplete 0.113 0.228 0.075 0.065 0.334*** 0.192 0.406** 0.309*** 
 (0.075) (0.163) (0.085) (0.054) (0.103) (0.133) (0.159) (0.057) 
Higher  0.032 -0.041 0.005 0.014 0.277*** 0.130 0.329*** 0.333*** 
 (0.050) (0.122) (0.045) (0.031) (0.069) (0.084) (0.099) (0.045) 
Single  0.136 -0.167 0.017 0.198*** -0.049 -0.153 -0.054 0.110 
 (0.102) (0.205) (0.087) (0.059) (0.111) (0.132) (0.154) (0.079) 
Divorced or widowed -0.035 -0.024 -0.063 -0.051* 0.078 0.069 0.111 0.014 
 (0.039) (0.098) (0.039) (0.027) (0.053) (0.084) (0.095) (0.045) 
One child 0.089 0.055 0.036 0.071 -0.129 -0.190* -0.120 -0.057 
 (0.071) (0.149) (0.063) (0.043) (0.087) (0.108) (0.122) (0.063) 
More than one child 0.148** 0.133 0.083 0.082* -0.084 -0.069 -0.106 -0.041 
 (0.074) (0.157) (0.067) (0.046) (0.095) (0.120) (0.136) (0.068) 
Mobility in the firm -0.015 0.027 -0.026 -0.001 -0.000 0.032 -0.004 0.024 
 (0.024) (0.058) (0.023) (0.015) (0.035) (0.048) (0.053) (0.023) 
Training outside 0.172*** 0.021 0.189*** 0.089** 0.162*** 0.132 0.198* 0.085* 
 (0.047) (0.125) (0.054) (0.040) (0.053) (0.092) (0.102) (0.046) 
Training in the firm -0.033 -0.019 -0.047* -0.053*** -0.167*** -0.131** -0.093 -0.136*** 
 (0.026) (0.061) (0.024) (0.016) (0.052) (0.056) (0.065) (0.031) 
Service staff -0.824*** -0.872*** -0.871*** -0.850*** -0.640*** -0.517*** -0.616*** -0.773*** 
 (0.054) (0.120) (0.048) (0.032) (0.075) (0.091) (0.103) (0.048) 
Engineers -0.180*** -0.118 -0.226*** -0.160*** -0.090* 0.323*** -0.121 -0.369*** 
 (0.041) (0.102) (0.038) (0.026) (0.053) (0.064) (0.078) (0.035) 
Accountants -0.086 0.573*** -0.316 -0.485*** 0.281*** 0.760*** 0.269** -0.237*** 
 (0.066) (0.211) (0.208) (0.057) (0.065) (0.106) (0.114) (0.053) 
Managers 0.557*** 0.888*** 0.485*** 0.426*** 0.767*** 1.466*** 0.677*** 0.207** 
 (0.044) (0.122) (0.055) (0.039) (0.071) (0.127) (0.178) (0.087) 
Constant 0.239 -0.759 -0.321 0.655 -2.254** -1.427* -2.356** -1.543** 
 (0.669) (1.500) (0.564) (0.442) (0.963) (0.840) (1.197) (0.679) 
Observations 1772 1772 1772 1772 1126 1126 1126 1126 
R-squared 0.30    0.29    
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. 
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Table A2 - OLS and quantile regressions by gender, 2002 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Males Females 
 OLS Quantile Regressions OLS Quantile Regressions 
  10th 50th 90th  10th 50th 90th 
Tenure  0.026*** 0.039*** 0.012** 0.018*** -0.001 -0.016 -0.013* 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) 
Tenure squared /100 -0.130*** -0.228*** -0.060 -0.095** 0.031 0.133 0.136** 0.022 
 (0.050) (0.083) (0.040) (0.039) (0.073) (0.088) (0.064) (0.088) 
Tenure cubed /1000 0.023*** 0.044*** 0.011 0.015** -0.003 -0.028 -0.029** -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.008) (0.007) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.021) 
Age  0.090*** 0.057 0.091*** 0.033 0.013 0.059 -0.024 0.033 
 (0.029) (0.054) (0.027) (0.024) (0.031) (0.065) (0.039) (0.036) 
Age squared /100 -0.196*** -0.115 -0.172*** -0.058 -0.015 -0.136 0.068 -0.081 
 (0.070) (0.134) (0.066) (0.061) (0.079) (0.163) (0.101) (0.094) 
Age cubed /1000 0.014** 0.008 0.011** 0.004 0.000 0.010 -0.006 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) 
Basic professional 0.050* 0.110** 0.000 0.036 0.002 0.010 -0.009 -0.042 
 (0.028) (0.047) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.047) (0.029) (0.035) 
Secondary general 0.025 0.053 -0.002 -0.021 0.066** 0.024 0.033 0.033 
 (0.026) (0.041) (0.022) (0.022) (0.030) (0.047) (0.030) (0.036) 
Secondary professional 0.027 0.081* 0.008 -0.033 0.098*** 0.133*** 0.057* 0.033 
 (0.029) (0.047) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.050) (0.031) (0.036) 
Higher incomplete 0.032 0.036 0.019 0.021 0.110** 0.192** 0.035 0.044 
 (0.064) (0.120) (0.062) (0.048) (0.047) (0.094) (0.063) (0.070) 
Higher  0.043 0.029 0.018 -0.028 0.141*** 0.136** 0.084** 0.168*** 
 (0.033) (0.061) (0.031) (0.028) (0.033) (0.061) (0.036) (0.043) 
Single  0.194*** 0.037 0.246*** 0.069 -0.020 0.026 0.023 0.073 
 (0.068) (0.151) (0.081) (0.076) (0.042) (0.085) (0.055) (0.057) 
Divorced or widowed -0.065*** -0.029 -0.108*** -0.050* -0.042 -0.060 -0.020 0.016 
 (0.025) (0.048) (0.026) (0.026) (0.036) (0.049) (0.032) (0.037) 
One child 0.221*** 0.067 0.315*** 0.050 0.054 0.045 0.129*** 0.124** 
 (0.059) (0.137) (0.074) (0.071) (0.036) (0.066) (0.042) (0.052) 
More than one child 0.211*** 0.028 0.331*** 0.067 0.090** 0.027 0.156*** 0.157*** 
 (0.061) (0.140) (0.075) (0.073) (0.042) (0.075) (0.048) (0.058) 
Mobility in the firm -0.061*** -0.081** -0.056*** -0.021 -0.048** -0.099*** -0.017 0.022 
 (0.017) (0.033) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021) (0.036) (0.021) (0.027) 
Training outside 0.131*** 0.060 0.104*** 0.075** 0.088* 0.089 0.138*** 0.027 
 (0.027) (0.059) (0.034) (0.035) (0.047) (0.061) (0.038) (0.039) 
Training in the firm -0.157*** -0.197*** -0.148*** -0.117*** -0.210*** -0.193*** -0.288*** -0.155*** 
 (0.016) (0.032) (0.016) (0.015) (0.022) (0.037) (0.024) (0.028) 
Service staff -0.686*** -0.589*** -0.845*** -0.413*** -0.578*** -0.438*** -0.672*** -0.673*** 
 (0.041) (0.057) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.064) (0.042) (0.049) 
Engineers -0.125*** -0.055 -0.164*** -0.056** -0.022 0.004 -0.082*** 0.030 
 (0.024) (0.049) (0.025) (0.023) (0.026) (0.049) (0.030) (0.035) 
Accountants -0.181*** 0.225* -0.286** -0.416*** 0.065 0.091 0.014 0.024 
 (0.037) (0.116) (0.143) (0.054) (0.042) (0.081) (0.046) (0.052) 
Managers 0.582*** 0.887*** 0.511*** 0.442*** 0.782*** 1.032*** 0.754*** 0.596*** 
 (0.027) (0.069) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.096) (0.062) (0.078) 
Constant -1.540*** -1.398** -1.650*** -0.284 -0.428 -1.209 0.130 -0.440 
 (0.367) (0.711) (0.348) (0.310) (0.384) (0.819) (0.483) (0.442) 
Observations 1853 1853 1853 1853 1121 1121 1121 1121 
R-squared 0.46    0.48    
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. 
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